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Abstract	
Using	 firm‐level	 data	 from	 2006	 to	 2013	 for	 a	 set	 of	 developing	 countries,	 we	 examine	 the	
effects	 of	 financial	 development	 on	 innovation.	 Financial	 development	 boosts	 innovation	 by	
improving	 resource	 allocation	 and	 investment	 toward	 strategic	 sectors	 as	well	 as	 facilitating	
technology	to	promote	growth.	Using	binary	response	models	as	well	as	instrumental	variable	
techniques	 to	 correct	 for	 endogeneity,	 we	 find	 robust	 but	 puzzling	 results.	 Contrary	 to	most	
existing	 literature,	 financial	 development	has	 a	 negative	 effect	 on	 the	probability	 of	 a	 firm	 to	
innovate.	The	effect	 is	conditional	on	firm	size,	and	only	 larger	firms	are	the	ones	that	benefit	
from	 financial	 development.	 These	 results	 are	 robust	 to	 different	 measures	 of	 financial	
development.	We	argue	that	this	is	a	result	of	the	design	of	the	financial	system	in	regards	to	the	
lack	 of	 capital	 and	 the	 institutional	 system.	 Consequently,	 developing	 countries	 should	 first	
generate	appropiate	insitutional	conditions	if	they	want	financial	development	to	spur	growth	
through	innovation.	
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I. Introduction	
Financial	development	boosts	economic	growth	by	lowering	information	and	transaction	costs	
when	mobilizing	 resources	 (Levine,	2005).	However,	 the	existing	 literature	 shows	ambiguous	
results	 in	 this	relationship.	On	 the	one	hand,	based	on	 theoretical	and	empirical	work,	Levine	
(2005)	argues	that	financial	development	has	a	positive	effect	on	growth	by	improving	resource	
allocation.	On	 the	 other	 hand,	Rousseau	 and	Wachtel	 (2011)	 suggest	 the	 benefits	 of	 financial	
deepening	 could	 lead	 many	 countries	 to	 liberalize	 before	 developing	 legal	 and	 regulatory	
institutions,	and	that	could	attenuate	the	positive	effect	of	 financial	development	on	economic	
growth.	 Moreover,	 Blanco	 (2013),	 using	 a	 sample	 of	 Latin	 American	 countries,	 finds	 that	
financial	development	has	no	significant	effect	on	economic	growth	in	the	short	term,	but	there	
are	long‐term	differentiated	effects.		
Two	related	reasons	may	explain	why	understanding	the	relationship	between	financial	
development	 and	 economic	 growth	 is	 difficult.	 First,	 the	 channels	 through	 which	 financial	
development	operate	are	not	well	understood.	Second,	current	studies	do	not	differentiate	the	
effect	 of	 financial	 development	 on	 growth	 at	 different	 stages	 of	 economic	 development	
(Levine(1997),	Levine	(2005),	Blanco	(2013))1.	This	paper	tackles	the	first	reason	by	providing	
significant	 evidence	 on	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 development	 on	 innovation	 in	 developing	
countries.		
From	 a	 classical	 perspective,	 following	 Schumpeter's	 (1911)	 thinking,	 financial	
intermediaries	 facilitate	 technological	 innovation	 and	 then	 affect	 growth	 and	 development.	
Moreover,	as	suggested	by	Levine	(2005),	 financial	development	improves	resource	allocation	
by	 creating	 innovative	 processes	 that	 promote	 investment,	 and	 that	 simultaneously	 leads	 to	
greater	productivity	and	then	to	economic	growth.		
Highly	 developed	 countries	 with	 innovative	 processes	 achieve	 economic	 growth	 and	
capital	 accumulation	 through	 global	 innovation	 networks	 that	 include	 institutions	 such	 as	
universities	 and	 think	 tanks,	 the	 production	 sector,	 global	 trade	 networks	 consisting	 of	
domestic	 and	 foreign	 markets,	 public	 policy	 makers,	 and	 financial	 channels	 (Moguillansky,	
2006).	Therefore,	the	effects	of	financial	development	on	innovation	are	expected	to	be	positive,	
but	 developing	 countries	 have	 limited	 access	 to	 global	 innovation	 networks	 due	 to	 a	 limited	
number	of	universities	and	limited	(or	nonexistent)	 interaction	between	different	 institutions.	
Along	with	 a	 limited	 financial	 sector,	 this	may	 reduce	 the	effects	of	 financial	development	on	
innovation.		
                                                            
1 According to the literature review on economic growth and financial development, the ambiguity of the 
effect might rely on the stage of development. That is, the effect is not the same for developed economies as it 
is for developing economies. 
To	 examine	 the	 relationship	 between	 financial	 development	 and	 innovation	 in	
developing	 economies,	we	use	 binary	 response	models,	 particularly	 probit	models.	 Following	
Benfratello	et	al.	(2008),	the	dependent	variable	is	the	probability	of	a	firm	to	innovate,	but	we	
do	 not	 differentiate	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 development	 on	 product	 innovation	 and	 process	
innovation	 because	 those	 are	 out	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 paper.	 More	 specifically,	 in	 order	 to	
measure	the	effects	on	innovation	as	a	whole,	we	use	the	probability	of	a	firm	to	introduce	new	
products,	processes,	or	patents	to	the	market	as	our	dependent	variable.	
Given	that	there	is	a	potential	endogenous	relationship	between	financial	development	
and	 innovation	 due	 to	 reverse	 causality	 and	 omitted	 variable	 bias,	 we	 apply	 instrumental	
variable	 techniques.	We	 include	 legal	 origins	 as	 an	 instrument	 for	 financial	 development.	 La	
Porta	 et	 al.	 (1997,	 1998)	 show	 that	 a	 country’s	 legal	 origin	 (English,	 French,	 German,	 or	
Scandinavian	 system)	 defines	 the	 current	 legal	 rules	 regarding	 the	 protection	 of	 corporate	
shareholders	 and	 creditors	 and	 influences	 the	 size	 of	 the	 debt	 and	 equity	 markets.	 Thus,	 it	
satisfies	the	condition	of	relevance	of	legal	origins	as	an	instrument.	Furthermore,	as	suggested	
by	Rajan	and	Zingales	(1998)	and	Beck	and	Levine	(2002),	most	countries	acquired	their	legal	
systems	 through	 occupation	 and	 colonialism;	 therefore,	 the	 legal	 origin	 of	 a	 country	 can	 be	
regarded	as	exogenous	and	is	likely	to	satisfy	the	exclusion	restriction	of	instrumental	variables.		
In	the	structure	of	the	paper,	we	present	the	literature	review	in	the	next	section.	In	the	
third	 section,	we	 briefly	 define	 financial	 development	 and	 innovation	 concepts	 and	 show	 the	
descriptive	statistics.	In	the	fourth	section,	we	specify	the	empirical	model.	In	the	fifth	section,	
we	interpret	the	results,	and	in	the	final	section,	we	provide	our	conclusions.		
II. Where	Do	We	Stand?	A	Brief	Review	of	the	Existing	Literature		
Although	existing	theory	(Tadesse,2005;	Sylla	et	al.,2006;	Dabla‐Norris	et	al.,2012;	Brown	et	al.	
2012;	among	others	)	asserts	that	increases	in	financial	development	push	for	larger	and	newer	
technological	 processes	 as	 well	 as	 better	 allocation	 of	 resources	 and	 investments	 toward	
innovation,	 the	 empirical	 evidence	 is	 not	 yet	 conclusive.	 This	 is	 mainly	 because	 financial	
development	spurs	innovation	conditional	in	different	factors,	such	as	the	size	of	the	economy,	
the	type	of	industries,	and	its	institutions	(Sylla	et	al.,	2006).		
From	a	more	 theoretical	perspective,	Dabla‐Norris	et	al.	 (2012)	examine	 the	effects	of	
financial	development	on	innovation	and	productivity	and	argue	that	the	relationship	between	
financial	 development,	 innovation,	 and	 productivity	 relies	 on	 the	 capability	 of	 the	 financial	
system	to	optimally	allocate	capital.	That	is,	"In	a	country	with	a	well‐developed	financial	sector,	
good	innovation	projects	are	more	likely	to	be	funded	than	bad	ones"	 (Dabla‐Norris	et	al.,	2012).	
These	authors	also	suggest	the	effects	of	financial	development	are	greater	for	high	technology	
firms	than	for	low	technology	firms.	Similarly,	Tadesse	(2005)	finds	evidence	that	industries	in	
financially	well‐developed	countries	significantly	reduce	real	costs	that	are	later	transformed	in	
innovation.	 He	 argues	 that	 greater	 financial	 development	 in	 a	 country	 leads	 to	 more	
productivity	through	innovation.	This	is	because	the	adoption	of	new	technologies	requires	high	
amounts	 of	 physical	 capital,	 which	 is	 dependent	 on	 well‐developed	 capital	 markets	 and	
institutions	encouraging	long‐term	investments	through	the	reduction	of	liquidity	risks.	In	this	
vein,	 Brown	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 argue	 that	 R&D	 is	 susceptible	 to	 financing	 constraints	 for	 several	
reasons.	Besides	 the	 lack	of	 collateral	 value	and	asymmetric	 information	problems,	R&D	may	
face	 adverse	 selection	 and	moral	 hazard	 problems,	 especially	 for	 younger,	 smaller	 firms.	 For	
those	firms,	financial	constraints	may	drive	investment	in	R&D	well	below	the	privately	optimal	
level	in	a	world	with	no	financial	frictions.	They	find	that	access	to	equity	finance	is	relevant	to	
R&D	 because	 public	 stock	 markets	 can	 foster	 economic	 growth	 by	 directly	 funding	 the	
innovative	 activity	 of	 young,	 entrepreneurial	 firms.	 Although	 they	 show	 that	 the	 absence	 of	
financing	constraints	increases	innovative	activity,	they	did	not	clearly	answer	the	question	of	
what	effect	financial	development	has	on	innovation.	
	Perhaps	closer	papers	 to	ours	are	 those	containing	 the	empirical	approaches	used	by	
Hsu	et	al.	(2014)	and	Sharma	(2007).	The	first	one	evaluates	the	relationship	between	financial	
development	 and	 innovation	 using	 cross	 country	 evidence,	 and	 it	 finds	 that	 equity	 markets	
encourage	 innovation	 in	 high‐tech	 industries	 and	 in	 industries	 that	 are	 highly	 dependent	 on	
external	 finance,	 in	 opposition	 to	 credit	markets	 that	 discourage	 it.	 They	 highlight	 that	 these	
effects	are	more	pronounced	 in	emerging	countries	and	 that	 such	effects	are	strengthened	or	
weakened	according	to	the	level	of	legality	and	the	shareholders'	protection.	Similarly,	Sharma	
(2007)	 emphasizes	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 financial	 development	 and	 innovation	 is	
conditional	on	the	firm	size	and	argues	that	financial	development	does	not	equally	affect	firms	
of	 different	 sizes.	 This	 author,	 who	 studies	 the	 problem	 through	 micro‐data,	 finds	 that	 the	
probability	 of	 small	 firms	 to	 invest	 in	R&D	as	 a	proxy	 for	 innovation	 is	higher	 if	 a	 country	 is	
financially	 well	 developed.	 The	 author	 argues	 that	 this	 relationship	 can	 have	 positive	
redistributive	 consequences	 in	 terms	 of	 encouraging	 small	 firms	 to	 invest	 in	 R&D.	 However,	
Sharma	(2007)	does	not	take	into	account	the	endogenous	relationship	of	the	variables,	which	
may	bias	the	coefficient	estimates	and	make	interpretation	of	his	results	difficult.	He	also	omits	
controls	such	as	the	variables	related	to	the	environment	where	firms	operate,	which	are	factors	
that	 facilitate	 the	way	 to	 achieve	 innovation,	 according	 to	 Camagni	 (1995)	 and	Moguillansky	
(2006).	
III. Definitions	and	Data		
To	examine	 the	 relationship	between	 financial	development	 and	 innovation,	we	use	 the	 firm‐
level	 dataset	 from	 the	 World	 Enterprise	 Surveys	 (World	 Bank	 Group,	 2013)	 that	 were	
conducted	between	2006	and	2013.	This	dataset	is	pooled	to	provide	more	information	for	the	
analysis.	 In	 order	 to	 account	 for	macro	 and	 institutional	 factors,	we	 complement	 the	 dataset	
with	country‐level	data.	The	main	source	for	the	country‐level	data	is	the	World	Development	
Indicators	(The	World	Bank,	2013).		
Considering	that	innovation	is	a	concept	that	encompasses	different	aspects	that	range	
from	the	process	of	firm	decision	making	to	legal	systems,	measuring	it	is	not	an	easy	task,	and	
its	discussion	has	been	widely	presented	in	the	literature	(Bhattacharya	and	Bloch,	2004;	Dabla‐
Norris	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Sharma,	 2007;	 among	 others).	 We	 use	 a	 comprehensive	 concept	 that	
encompasses	 the	creation	or	development	of	 a	new	product	or	 service,	a	new	process,	or	 the	
existence	of	patents.	Therefore,	we	define	innovation	in	a	dichotomous	way,	where	0	means	the	
company	does	not	have	patents	or	new	products,	services,	or	processes,	and	1	means	it	presents	
any	of	the	three	types.	Financial	development	is	measured	as	the	ratio	of	private	credit	to	GDP.	
Following	Beck	et	al.	(2007),	we	argue	that	this	is	the	best	measure	for	financial	development	
because	it	"captures	the	amount	of	credit	channeled	from	savers,	through	financial	intermediaries,	
to	private	firms."	Moreover,	we	recognize	the	existence	of	an	endogenous	relationship	between	
financial	 development	 and	 innovation.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 financial	 development	 can	 lead	 to	
innovative	processes,	but	on	the	other	hand,	one	could	say	that	more	innovation	can	cause	more	
financial	development	 in	 terms	of	an	 increasing	demand	for	 funding	(Benfratello	et	al.,	2008).	
To	solve	this	problem,	we	are	using	the	instrumental	variable	suggested	by	La	Porta	et	al.	(1998,	
1997)	and	then	used	by	several	authors	like	Levine	et	al.	(2000)	Levine	(2005)	and	Clarke	et	al.	
(2006).	 This	 variable	 consists	 of	 linking	 financial	 development	 with	 the	 legal	 origin	 of	 the	
country	from	The	Foreign	Law	Guide	(Marci	Hoffman,	2014).	La	Porta	et	al.'s	main	idea	is	that	
because	it	is	not	arranged	by	the	country,	the	legal	system	represents	the	capacity	of	the	system	
to	protect	property	rights	and	adapt	itself	to	the	newer	circumstances.	In	that	order	of	ideas,	La	
Porta	et	al.,	based	on	Reynolds’	and	Flores’	classification,	 identifies	 four	types	of	 legal	origins:	
common	 law	 or	 English,	 French,	 German,	 and	 Scandinavian,	with	 the	 last	 three	 coming	 from	
Roman	civil	law	traditions.	La	Porta	et	al.’s	findings	indicate	that	common	law	is	associated	with	
higher	financial	development	due	to	the	use	of	jurisprudence	as	the	main	source	of	obligations.	
In	 addition,	 a	 set	 of	 controls	 used	 in	 previous	 literature	 are	 included	 in	 order	 to	 account	 for	
factors	such	as	the	size	of	the	economy	and	wealth,	human	capital,	firm	size,	and	industry.		
Our	 dataset	 consists	 of	 15,215	 representative	 firms	 from	 24	 emerging	 countries	 (see	
Appendix 1)	 mostly	 located	 in	 Latin	 America	 and	 the	 Caribbean	 (77.7%),	 followed	 by	 Asia	
(15.3%),	 and	 Africa	 (7%).	 In	 terms	 of	 sector	 industry,	 it	 consists	 of	 data	 from	 13	 different	
industries,	 with	 the	 largest	 share	 of	 firms	 operating	 in	 the	 food	 industry	 (22.46%),	 and	 the	
remainder	consisting	of	other	manufacturing	(16.71%),	garments	(14.41%),	and	chemicals	and	
pharmacy	 (13.03%)	 (see	 Appendix	 1).	 Regarding	 our	 innovation	 definition,	 61%	 of	 the	
companies	answered	that	they	do	not	have	innovation	processes,	and	the	remaining	39%	have	
at	 least	 one	 innovative	 process,	 product,	 or	 patent2.	 Furthermore,	 63%	 of	 the	 firms	 innovate	
through	new	products	or	services,	60%	through	new	processes,	and	only	11%	have	patents.	In	
addition,	 the	 survey	 provides	 the	 value	 of	 total	 sales	 (in	 U.S.	 million	 dollars)	 as	 well	 as	 the	
number	 of	 employees.	 Those	 are	 the	measures	 of	 firm	 size	we	 use	 in	 the	 estimations	 of	 the	
model.	The	largest	firm	in	the	sample	reported	$500	million	in	annual	sales,	while	the	smallest	
reported	$2,300.	The	average	of	annual	sales	($75.5	million)	and	its	standard	deviation	($5.05	
million)	creates	large	size	differences	in	the	sample.	In	terms	of	employees,	the	survey	classifies	
the	firm	size	in	three	groups	based	on	the	number	of	employees.	Small	firms	have	fewer	than	20	
employees	and	represent	41%	of	the	sample.	Medium	firms	have	between	20	and	99	employees	
and	represent	36%	of	the	sample,	and	large	firms	have	more	than	100	employees	and	represent	
23%	of	the	sample.	 It	 is	also	essential	 to	note	that	small	 firms	are	given	a	value	of	1,	medium	
firms	a	value	of	2,	and	large	firms	a	value	of	3.	
The	 survey	 asks	 several	 questions	 related	 to	 the	 institutional	 system	 perception.	We	
consider	the	question,	"What	percentage	of	senior	management	time	was	spent	in	dealing	with	
government	 regulations?"	 The	 answers	 give	 us	 an	 idea	 of	 the	 institutional	 environments	 in	
which	the	firms	operate.	According	to	the	data,	256	firms	answered	that	the	percentage	of	time	
senior	management	 spent	dealing	with	government	 regulations	was	100%,	while	3,506	 firms	
answered	that	it	was	0%.	The	average	was	13.6%	of	their	time.	
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable	 Source	 Obs	 Mean	 Std.	Dev.	
Minimu
m	
Maximu
m	
Innovation	Index	 WES	 15215 0.616	 0.835	 0	 2	
Innovation	Dummy	 WES	 15215 0.386	 0.487	 0	 1	
Product	or	service	
innovation	 WES	 6890	 0.631	 0.483	 0	 1	
Process	innovation	 WES	 8309	 0.110	 0.313	 0	 1	
Patents	innovation	 WES	 6898	 0.595	 0.491	 0	 1	
GDP	($US	in	millions)	 WDI	 23	 160000	 261000	 4,720	 1,080,000
GDP	pc	($US)	 WDI	 23	 4766	 3907	 435	 12,344	
Population	(Millions)	 WDI	 23	 35.300	 52.800	 1.96	 239	
School	Enrollment	Net	(%)	 WDI	 20	 61.500	 16.300	 27.8	 83.9	
School	Enrollment	Gross	 WDI	 23	 70.100	 21.000	 24.6	 93.2	
                                                            
2 None	of	the	firms	have	the	three	kinds	of	innovative	aspects	in	the	company. 
(%)	
Time	Spent	in	Regulations	 WES	 14700 13.566	 19.297	 0	 100	
Financial	development	1	 WDI	 11774 24.932	 21.253	 2.267	 93.161	
Financial	development	2	 WDI	 11774 21.881	 17.582	 2.267	 93.161	
English	 The	Foreign	Low	Guide	 15215 0.064	 0.245	 0	 1	
French	 The	Foreign	Low	Guide	 15215 0.923	 0.267	 0	 1	
Scandinavian	 The	Foreign	Low	Guide	 15215 0.013	 0.114	 0	 1	
Regarding	 our	macro	 variables,	 the	 richest	 country	 in	 the	 sample	 in	 terms	 of	 GDP	 is	
Mexico,	 with	 an	 average	 gross	 domestic	 product	 of	 $1.084	 billion	 between	 2006	 and	 2013,	
while	the	poorest	is	Gambia	with	an	average	GDP	of	$874	million	in	the	same	time	frame,	which	
provides	 significant	 variation.	 Alternatively,	 the	 largest	 country	 in	 terms	 of	 population	 is	
Indonesia	 (239,000,000	 people	 on	 average	 between	 2006	 and	 2013),	 and	 the	 smallest	 is	
Botswana	 (1,959,708	 people).	 It	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 the	 country	 size	 because	 larger	
countries	with	more	people	have	larger	economies.		
To	 estimate	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 development	 on	 innovation,	 we	 use	 two	 different	
measures	for	financial	development.	As	we	explained	before	and	as	was	suggested	by	Levine	et	
al.	(2000),	Levine	(2005),	Beck	et	al.	(2007),	,	and	others,	the	main	measure	we	use	is	the	ratio	
of	 private	 credit	 to	 GDP.	 There	 is	 a	 significant	 difference	 in	 the	 ratio	 across	 countries	 in	 the	
sample,	 ranging	 from	 a	 low	 of	 2%	 to	 a	 high	 of	 93%.	 An	 alternative	 measure	 of	 a	 country’s	
financial	development	is	the	ratio	of	private	credit	by	deposit	money	banks	to	GDP.	As	we	are	
conscious	 that	 this	proxy	does	not	 include	 credit	 to	 the	private	 sector	by	non‐deposit	money	
banks,	 this	 measure	 is	 better	 viewed	 as	 a	 robustness	 check.	 The	 data	 of	 the	 instrumental	
variable	 and	 legal	 origins	 comes	 from	The	 Foreign	 Law	Guide	 (Marci	Hoffman,	 2014).	 Of	 the	
countries	in	the	sample,	92%	have	French	legal	origins,	7%	have	English	legal	origins,	and	1%	
have	Scandinavian	legal	origins.	
IV. Empirical	Specification	
Given	that	our	dependent	variable	is	a	dummy	that	equals	1	when	the	innovation	index	
is	greater	than	0	and	equals	0	when	the	innovation	index	is	0,	we	initially	employ	a	probit	model	
to	 estimate	 the	 effects	 of	 financial	 development	 on	 the	probability	 of	 a	 firm	 to	 innovate.	 The	
empirical	model	is	as	follows:	
൛1ூ௡௡஽௨௠௠௬೔வ଴ൟ ൌ Pr	ሺߙ ൅ ߜ௝௬	 ൅ 	ߚ଴ܵ݅ݖ݁௜௝௖ ൅ ߚଵܨ݅݊݀݁ݒଵ௖ ൅ ߚଶܨ݅݊݀݁ݒଵ௖ ∗ ܵ݅ݖ݁௜௝௖ ൅
	ߚଷܩܦܲܲܥ௖ ൅	ߚସܩܦܲܲܥ௖ ∗ ܵ݅ݖ݁௜௝௖ ൅ 	ߚହܵ݁݊݊݁ݐ௖ ൅ ߚ଺ܵ݁݊݊݁ݐ௖ ∗ ܵ݅ݖ݁௜௝௖ ൅
	ߚ଻ܶ݅݉݁ܵ݌݁݊ݐܴ݁݃௜௝௖ ൅ ߚ଼ܶ݅݉݁ܵ݌݁݊ݐܴ݁݃௜௝௖ ∗ ܵ݅ݖ݁௜௝௖ ൅ ߝ௜௝௖ ൒ 0ሻ 		
(1)
Where	 Inndummy	 is	 the	 probability	 of	 a	 firm	 to	 innovate,	ߜ௝௬	are	 industry	 and	 year	
dummies	to	control	for	cross	industry	heterogeneity	and	potential	yearly	variation,	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜௝௖	is	the	
firm	size	based	on	the	number	of	employees,	ܨ݅݊݀݁ݒଵ௖	is	the	financial	development	of	a	country,	
ܨ݅݊݀݁ݒଵ௖ 	∗ ܵ݅ݖ݁௜௝௖	is	 the	relationship	between	 the	 financial	development	of	a	country	and	 the	
firm	size,	ܩܦܲܲܥ௖	is	 the	size	of	 the	economy	of	a	 country,	ܩܦܲܲܥ௖ ∗ ܵ݅ݖ݁௜௝௖	is	 the	relationship	
between	 the	 size	 of	 the	 economy	 and	 the	 firm	 size,	ܵ݁݊݊݁ݐ௖	represents	 the	 stock	 of	 human	
capital	 of	 a	 country,	ܵ݁݊݊݁ݐ௖ ∗ ܵ݅ݖ݁௜௝௖	is	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 human	 capital	 and	 the	
firm	size,	ܶ݅݉݁ܵ݌݁݊ݐܴ݁݃௜௝௖	represents	the	institutional	environment	in	which	the	firm	operates,	
and	ܶ݅݉݁ܵ݌݁݊ݐܴ݁݃௜௝௖ ∗ ܵ݅ݖ݁௜௝௖	is	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 institutional	 environment	 and	
the	firm	size.	
As	there	is	an	endogenous	relationship	between	financial	development	and	innovation,	
we	 correct	 the	 model	 estimating	 a	 two‐step	 probit	 using	 legal	 origins	 as	 an	 instrumental	
variable.	We	use	two‐step	estimation	instead	of	maximum	likelihood	because	the	latter	requires	
a	 specific	 complete	 set	of	 instruments	 and,	 consequently,	 usually	becomes	 inconsistent	 if	 any	
instrument	 is	 omitted,	 while	 the	 two‐step	 estimation	 could	 sacrifice	 efficiency	 but	 not	
consistency	 in	 the	 same	conditions.	 In	 the	 first	 stage,	we	estimate	 financial	development	as	 a	
function	of	legal	origins	(English,	French,	Scandinavian,	or	German),	and	in	the	second	stage,	we	
use	the	estimated	financial	development	to	estimate	the	probability	of	a	firm	to	innovate.	
As	the	main	purpose	of	this	paper	is	to	identify	the	effects	financial	development	has	on	
the	probability	to	innovate,	the	first	explanatory	variable	we	consider	in	the	model	is	financial	
development.	 If	 positive,	 the	 coefficient	 of	 this	 variable	 would	 indicate	 that	 more	 financially	
developed	 countries	 have	 greater	 probability	 to	 innovate.	 If	 negative,	 it	 would	 indicate	 that	
more	 financially	 developed	 countries	 have	 lower	 probability	 to	 innovate.	 Existing	 literature	
(Benfratello	et	al.,	2008;	Dabla‐Norris	et	al.,	2012),	finds	a	positive	link	between	those	variables,	
but	 as	 we	 are	 considering	 only	 developing	 countries,	 the	 effects	 are	 not	 yet	 clear.	 We	 also	
consider	the	interaction	between	financial	development	and	firm	size	in	order	to	determine	if	
financial	 development	 has	 different	 effects	 on	 firms,	 depending	 on	 their	 size.	 A	 positive	ߚଶ	
would	signify	that	financial	development	increases	the	probability	to	innovate	to	a	larger	extent	
in	 large	 firms.	 In	 contrast,	 a	negative	ߚଶ	would	 indicate	 that	 financial	development	boosts	 the	
probability	 to	 innovate	 to	a	 larger	extent	 in	small	 firms.	Also,	 the	 firm	size	 is	an	 independent	
variable	in	the	model.		
Likewise,	 the	 income	level	of	a	country	 is	considered	 in	the	model	as	a	control	 for	the	
size	of	 the	economy.	 In	 this	 case,	 a	positive	ߚଷ	would	 imply	 that	 if	 a	 firm	operates	 in	 a	 larger	
economy,	its	probability	to	innovate	is	also	greater,	but	a	negative	coefficient	implies	that	larger	
economies	 have	 lower	 probability	 to	 innovate.	 We	 expect	 this	 relationship	 to	 be	 positive	
because	when	 there	are	more	 resources	 in	a	 country,	 there	 is	 greater	 investment	 in	 research	
and	 development	 and,	 consequently,	 greater	 probability	 to	 innovate.	 As	 done	 with	 financial	
development,	we	interact	the	GDP	per	capita	with	the	firm	size.	We	do	this	to	evaluate	how	the	
size	of	the	economy	affects	firms	differently.	Consequently,	the	interpretation	of	the	coefficient	
is	similar	to	the	interpretation	of	the	interaction	between	financial	development	and	firm	size.	A	
positive	coefficient	would	indicate	that	a	larger	economy	increases	the	probability	to	innovate	
to	 a	 greater	 extent	 in	 large	 firms,	 while	 a	 negative	 coefficient	 would	 signify	 that	 a	 larger	
economy	improves	the	probability	to	innovate	to	a	greater	extent	in	small	firms.	
As	used	by	Levine	and	Renelt	 (1992),	Barro	(1991),	and	Mankiw	et	al.	 (1992),	we	use	
net	 school	 enrollment	 as	 a	 proxy	 for	 human	 capital.	 A	 positive	ߚହ	for	 this	 variable	 would	
indicate	 a	 positive	 relationship	 between	 human	 capital	 and	 the	 probability	 to	 innovate.	
Consequently,	 a	 larger	 supply	 of	 human	 capital	 in	 a	 country	 increases	 the	 probability	 to	
innovate.	 In	 contrast,	 a	 negative	ߚହ	would	 indicate	 a	 negative	 relationship	 between	 the	
variables.	It	is	important	to	consider	human	capital	as	a	control	because	when	there	are	higher	
levels	of	education	among	the	population,	there	is	more	knowledge	that	could	be	employed	to	
develop	 new	 products,	 services,	 processes,	 or	 patents.	 That	 is	 why	 we	 expect	 a	 positive	
coefficient	for	this	variable.		
In	 order	 to	 examine	 ways	 the	 effect	 changes	 between	 firms	 based	 on	 size,	 we	 cross	
human	 capital	with	 firm	 size.	A	positive	 coefficient	 of	 this	 variable	would	 imply	 that	 a	 larger	
stock	 of	 human	 capital	 in	 a	 country	 would	 benefit	 large	 firms	 to	 a	 greater	 degree,	 while	 a	
negative	 coefficient	would	 indicate	 the	 contrary.	 In	 this	 case,	we	expect	 a	negative	 coefficient	
for	ߚ଺	because	if	the	stock	of	human	capital	is	larger,	the	smaller	firms	increase	their	probability	
to	have	skilled	employees.	
As	 explained	 by	 Camagni	 (1995)	 and	 Moguillansky	 (2006),	 variables	 related	 to	 the	
environments	where	firms	operate	are	also	important	factors	that	facilitate	innovation.	That	is	
why	 the	 last	 explanatory	 variable	we	 consider	 is	 the	 percentage	 of	 senior	management	 time	
spent	dealing	with	government	regulations.	A	positive	coefficient	for	this	variable	would	imply	
that	 if	more	 time	 is	 needed	 to	 deal	with	 government	 regulations,	 the	 probability	 to	 innovate	
would	increase.	A	negative	coefficient	signifies	that	 less	time	needed	to	deal	with	government	
regulations	 would	 lead	 to	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 probability	 to	 innovate.	 For	 this	 institutional	
variable,	we	expect	a	negative	ߚ଻.	If	the	conditions	in	which	a	firm	operates	makes	it	harder	to	
innovate,	it	is	reasonable	to	suppose	that	the	probability	to	innovate	would	decrease.	As	we	did	
with	all	the	independent	variables,	we	crossed	this	indicator	with	the	firm	size.	If	the	coefficient	
of	this	 interaction	is	positive,	 it	 implies	that	the	institutional	variable	benefits	the	larger	firms	
more.	
Finally,	 we	 also	 use	 industry	 dummies	 to	 explain	 how	 operating	 in	 a	 specific	 sector	
could	boost	or	lower	the	probability	to	innovate.	
V. Results	and	Discussion	
Table 2	presents	the	results	obtained	from	the	first	specification	of	the	model	and	shows	
the	estimated	coefficients	and	their	p‐values	in	parentheses.	The	probability	to	innovate	is	the	
dependent	 variable	 on	 the	 first	 column	 of	 the	 table.	 In	 this	 first	 analysis,	 considering	 that	
endogeneity	was	not	corrected,	the	results	of	the	financial	development	are	not	very	consistent	
but	are	always	statistically	significant.	When	just	financial	development	and	firm	size	based	on	
number	of	employees	are	taken	into	account,	the	sign	of	financial	development	is	negative,	and	
the	 firm	 size	 has	 a	 positive	 sign,	 which	 intuitively	 means	 the	 whole	 effect	 of	 financial	
development	is	negative	to	the	probability	to	innovate,	and	the	effect	of	the	firm	size	augments	
the	 probability	 to	 innovate.	 However,	 this	 result	 is	 not	 conclusive	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 other	
important	 variables.	 When	 other	 variables	 are	 included,	 the	 effect	 of	 financial	 development	
seems	to	be	different.	For	example,	when	financial	development,	firm	size,	and	GDP	per	capita	
are	considered,	the	total	effect	of	financial	development	appears	to	be	positive,	as	suggested	by	
Sharma	 (2007),	 but	 the	 sign	 of	 GDP	 per	 capita	 does	 not	 make	 sense	 according	 to	 economic	
theory	(Schumpeter,	1911;	King	and	Levine,	1993;	Levine	et	al.,	2000).	That	is	why	measures	of	
human	 capital	 (Marvel	 and	 Lumpkin,	 2007)	 and	 an	 institutional	 environment	 variable	 that	
considers	 the	 relationship	 between	 enterprise	 and	 government	 (Sylla	 et	 al.,2006)	 are	
introduced	in	the	first	stage	and	subsequently	interacted	with	firm	size.	When	this	happens,	the	
sign	of	financial	development	changes	again.	
The	regression	that	includes	all	the	controls	indicates	the	effect	of	financial	development	
is	negative,	meaning	an	 increase	 in	 financial	development	reduces	 the	probability	of	a	 firm	to	
innovate	 in	 developing	 countries,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 probability	 increases	 for	 large	
enterprises	due	to	the	positive	sign	of	the	interaction	between	size	and	financial	development.	
This	 result	 may	 explain	 the	 variation	 in	 financial	 development’s	 sign	 among	 the	 regressions	
because	the	initial	specifications	were	not	able	to	absorb	the	companies'	size	effects.	This	first	
approach,	 although	 inconclusive,	 is	 contrary	 with	 the	 literature	 on	 the	 topic.	 According	 to	
Tadesse	 (2005),	 a	 well‐developed	 financial	 system	 mobilizes	 high	 amounts	 of	 capital.	 What	
could	 be	 happening	 in	 these	 countries	 is	 the	 financial	 system	 is	 not	 structured,	 or	 not	 as	
developed	as	it	needs	to	be	to	allow	capital	mobilization	over	all	kinds	of	enterprises,	instead	of	
just	the	large	ones.	Because	most	enterprises	are	medium	or	small,	the	total	effect	is	negative.	
These	results	also	contradict	Benfratello	et	al.’s	(2008)	results.	Although	their	study	focuses	on	
Italy,	it	does	not	differentiate	the	effect	of	financial	development	over	the	development	level	of	
the	economies,	and	that	could	cover	a	general	effect.	

Table 2 The effect of financial development on the probability to innovate: Probit regressions 
Variables	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Financial	Development	 ‐0.00620*** 0.00216***	 0.000327	 0.000396	 ‐0.0123***	
		 (0.000594)	 (0.000674)	 (0.000839)	 (0.000855)	 (0.00265)	
Size	 0.137***	 0.221***	 0.223***	 0.222***	 0.663***	
		 (0.0155)	 (0.0164)	 (0.0188)	 (0.0191)	 (0.120)	
GDPpc	 ‐0.000143*** ‐0.000151*** ‐0.000150***	 ‐0.000241***
		 (4.12e‐06)	 (5.50e‐06)	 (5.57e‐06)	 (1.39e‐05)	
School	Enrollment	net	 0.00507***	 0.00458***	 0.0280***	
		 (0.00170)	 (0.00173)	 (0.00424)	
Time	Spent	in	Regulations		 ‐0.00106	 0.00143	
		 (0.000731)	 (0.00191)	
Financial	Development*Size	 0.00571***	
		 (0.00117)	
GDPpc*Size	 4.64e‐05***	
		 (6.68e‐06)	
School	Enrollment	net*Size	 ‐0.0124***	
		 (0.00216)	
Time	Spent	in	Reg*Size	 ‐0.00127	
		 (0.000934)	
Sector	and	Year	Dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Observations	 11,768	 11,768	 9,371	 9,101	 9,101	
Pseudo	R²	 0.0667	 0.1485	 0.1602	 0.1629	 0.1664	
Prob>Chi²	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
Notes:	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
Significance	levels:	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
Time	Spent	in	Regulations means	"Percentage	of	senior´s	management	time	spent	in	dealing	with	
government	regulation"	
Table	3,	on	the	other	hand,	presents	the	results	obtained	from	the	second	specification	
of	 the	 model,	 which	 takes	 into	 account	 the	 endogenous	 relationship	 between	 financial	
development	and	the	probability	of	 innovation.	 In	this	table	 it	 is	possible	to	see	the	estimated	
coefficients	 and	 their	 p‐values	 in	 parentheses.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 instrumental	
variable	fixes	the	endogeneity	over	financial	development	(the	ratio	of	private	credit	to	GDP),	an	
action	that	also	indirectly	eliminates	the	endogenous	relationship	contained	in	GDP	per	capita.	
This	 happens	 because	 the	 channel	 through	 which	 GDP	 affects	 innovation	 is	 financial	
development,	and	we	are	measuring	this	with	an	exogenous	variable.	When	the	model	considers	
the	 endogenous	 relationship,	 the	 financial	 development	 sign	 is	 negative	 for	 all	 specifications	
and	 statistically	 significant	 at	 the	1%	 level,	which	 confirms	 the	 explanation	 above	 about	 firm	
size	and	capital	mobilizations.	 In	other	words,	 in	developing	 countries,	 financial	development	
reduces	the	probability	of	a	firm	to	innovate	because	it	only	mobilizes	resources	for	large	firms,	
and	the	majority	of	firms	are	small	or	medium.	This	result	can	also	be	explained	based	on	Yan	et	
al.	 (2014),	 who	 say	 that	 "for	an	 emerging	 country	with	 insufficient	 capital,	a	more	developed	
credit	market	might	imply	a	highly	leveraged	capital	structure	that	cannot	afford	losses	from	risky	
investment	and	thus	would	discourage	investments	in	innovative	projects."	 (Yan	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 In	
addition,	these	authors	also	suggest	that	weak	legal	structures,	which	could	be	evidenced	by	the	
time	 managers	 spend	 dealing	 with	 government	 issues,	 are	 also	 associated	 with	 fewer	
innovation	processes	 (Yan	et	al.,	2014).	Even	more,	with	 this	result	and	considering	King	and	
Levine’s	 (1993)	 results,	 it	 can	 be	 said	 that	 if	 financial	 development	 spurs	 growth,	 even	 in	
developing	 countries,	 the	 channel	 through	which	 this	 is	 done	 is	 not	 innovation.	 The	 above	 is	
reinforced	with	the	remaining	results,	which	 indicate	 firm	size	 is	a	positive	and	is	statistically	
significant	at	1%	and	the	time	spent	by	senior	managers	dealing	with	government	regulations	
has	a	negative	effect	on	innovation	and	is	significant	at	5%,	but	it	has	a	positive	effect	if	the	firm	
is	larger	(Time	Spent	In	Regulations*Size	has	a	5%	significance).	
Thus,	 under	 the	 circumstances	 in	 these	 countries,	 the	GDP	per	 capita	 of	 the	 economy	
that	has	a	statistical	significance	of	5%,	the	positive	effects	over	the	smaller	firms	(GDPpc*Size	
has	significance	of	5%),	and	the	accumulation	of	human	capital,	which	increases	the	probability	
to	 innovate	at	smaller	 firms	(both	with	a	significance	 level	of	1%)	might	work	to	 increase	the	
probability	to	innovate.	
Table	3	the	effect	of	financial	development	on	the	probability	to	innovate:	Instrumented	
Probit	Regressions	
Variables	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Financial	
Development	
0.00239	 ‐0.0345** ‐0.401*** ‐0.374***	 ‐2.279***
(0.00430)	 (0.0175) (0.0942) (0.0838)	 (0.855)
Size	 0.128***	 0.214*** 0.0349 0.0408	 29.71***(0.0163)	 (0.0189) (0.128) (0.119)	 (10.97)
GDPpc	 ‐5.50e‐05 0.000271** 0.000245***	 0.000911**(4.27e‐05) (0.000106) (9.48e‐05)	 (0.000460)
School	Enrollment	
net	
0.301*** 0.285***	 1.729***
(0.0694) (0.0628)	 (0.639)
Time	Spent	in	
Regulations	
‐0.0163***	 ‐0.0690**
(0.00546)	 (0.0330)
Financial	
Development*Size	
1.029***
(0.386)
GDPpc*Size	 ‐0.000582**(0.000248)
School	Enrollment	
net*Size	
‐0.769***
(0.285)
Time	Spent	in	
Regulations	*Size	
0.0466**
(0.0206)
Constant	 ‐0.3380603	 0.6826828 ‐13.51751 ‐12.5961	 ‐66.33474(0.1029252)	 (.1435329) (‐3.1662) (‐2.83203)	 (‐24.6051)
Sector	and	Year	
Dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Observations	 11,768	 11,768 9,371 9,101 9,101	
Wald	test	of	
exogeneity	Chi²		 3.66	 6.77	 82.2	 87.53	 234.68	
Notes:	Standard	errors	in	parentheses.	Significance	levels:	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1‐	
Time	Spent	in	Regulations	means	"Percentage	of	senior´s	management	time	spent	in	dealing	with	government	regulation"	
Finally,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 analyze	 the	marginal	 effects	 at	 the	mean	 to	 understand	 the	
implications	of	the	results.	Table	4	shows	the	marginal	effects	of	each	variable	in	the	model	at	
the	mean	in	the	second	column	and	the	standard	error,	the	test	statistic	z,	the	P	value,	and	the	
mean,	 respectively.	 Based	 on	 these	 results,	 for	 a	 firm	 located	 in	Argentina	 in	 2010,	 a	 year	 in	
which	 the	 country	was	 around	 the	mean	value	of	 FD,	 and	 assuming	 the	other	variables	were	
also	approximate	to	the	mean,	an	increase	of	1%	in	the	financial	development	indicator	would	
have	 reduced	 the	 probability	 of	 innovation	 at	 such	 firm	by	 0.89	 percentage	 points.	 However,	
this	same	increase	in	financial	development	would	have	caused	an	increase	in	the	probability	to	
innovate	 of	 around	 0.5	 percentage	 points	 if	 the	 firm	 is	 large.	 This	 means	 the	 probability	 of	
innovation	 at	 a	 medium	 size	 firm	 compared	 to	 a	 large	 size	 firm	 is	 11.5%	 lower,	 and	 the	
probability	a	small	enterprise	innovates	compared	with	a	large	one	is	23%	lower.	
Moreover,	the	effects	of	the	control	variables	over	innovation	are	relevant.	If	the	country	
increases	 its	 school	 enrollment	 by	 1%,	 the	 probability	 for	 the	 average	 firm	 in	 the	 sample	 to	
innovate	 increases	by	0.67	percentage	points,	 and	 if	 the	 firm	 is	 small,	 this	 increase	 in	human	
capital	leads	to	an	increase	in	the	probability	to	innovate.	Also,	if	the	firm	is	within	the	average	
values,	an	increase	of	1%	of	manager’s	time	spent	dealing	with	government	regulations	leads	to	
a	 reduction	 of	 0.028	 percentage	 points	 in	 the	 probability	 of	 innovation.	 Because	 this	 last	
marginal	effect	 is	very	 low,	one	could	say	the	thesis	on	the	need	 for	 institutional	stability	and	
the	prejudice	caused	by	the	incumbents,	as	indicated	by	Sylla	et	al.	(2006),	is	true	but	must	be	
corroborated	by	other	specifications,	as	done	by	LeBel	(2008).	
It	is	relevant	to	note	that	the	sector	that	enhances	the	probability	of	a	firm	to	innovate	
the	most	 is	 the	 food	sector,	 taking	 into	consideration	that	other	manufacturing	may	contain	a	
large	variety	of	economic	activities.	Meanwhile,	a	firm	in	the	metal	and	machinery	sector	has	the	
lowest	probability	to	innovate.	These	results	are	not	statistically	significant,	however.		
Finally,	 the	 results	 are	 robust	 using	 an	 alternative	measure	 of	 financial	 development	
that	as	described	above	consists	of	the	private	credit	only	emitted	by	banks	to	GDP.	Results	are	
similar	with	estimates	of	 the	regression	without	considering	the	endogenous	relationship	and	
then	are	also	similar	to	the	previous	results.	It	is	relevant	to	consider	that	the	results	were	not	
robust	 with	 an	 alternative	 measure	 of	 company	 size.	 While	 using	 sales	 of	 the	 company	 the	
variables	were	omitted	because	of	 co‐linearity,	which	 impedes	an	appropriate	 analysis	of	 the	
results.	(see	Appendix 2)	
	 	
Table 4 Marginal effects at the mean for Instrumented Probit Regressions 
Variable	 dy/dx	 Std.	Err.	 z	 P>z	
95%	
Conf.	 Interval	
Financial	Development	 ‐0.899	 0.100	 ‐8.950	 0.000	 ‐1.096	 ‐0.702	
Financial	Development*Size	 0.407	 0.045	 8.950	 0.000	 0.318	 0.496	
Size	 11.552	 1.281	 9.020	 0.000	 9.041	 14.063	
GDP	pc	 0.000	 0.000	 7.490	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
GDPpc*Size	 0.000	 0.000	 ‐8.400	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
School	Enrollment	net	 0.671	 0.075	 8.970	 0.000	 0.524	 0.818	
School	Enrollment	net*Size	 ‐0.301	 0.033	 ‐9.000	 0.000	 ‐0.367	 ‐0.236	
Time	Spent	in	regulations	 ‐0.028	 0.003	 ‐8.640	 0.000	 ‐0.034	 ‐0.022	
Time	Spent	in	Regulations*Size	 0.019	 0.002	 8.690	 0.000	 0.015	 0.023	
resother	 ‐0.004	 0.001	 ‐5.080	 0.000	 ‐0.006	 ‐0.002	
Sector:	Garments	 0.015	 0.019	 0.830	 0.406	 ‐0.021	 0.052	
Sector:	Food	 ‐0.029	 0.018	 ‐1.630	 0.104	 ‐0.064	 0.006	
Sector:	Metals	and	machinery	 ‐0.078	 0.020	 ‐3.920	 0.000	 ‐0.117	 ‐0.039	
Sector:	Electronics	 0.105	 0.029	 3.560	 0.000	 0.047	 0.163	
Sector:	Chemicals	and	pharmaceuticals	 0.076	 0.019	 4.080	 0.000	 0.039	 0.112	
Sector:	Wood	and	furniture	 0.048	 0.066	 0.730	 0.465	 ‐0.081	 0.176	
Sector:	Non‐metalic	and	plastic	
materials	 ‐0.091	 0.021	 ‐4.300	 0.000	 ‐0.132	 ‐0.049	
Secotor:	Auto	and	auto	components	 0.117	 0.135	 0.870	 0.383	 ‐0.146	 0.381	
Sector:	Other	manufacturing	 ‐0.116	 0.020	 ‐5.810	 0.000	 ‐0.155	 ‐0.077	
Sector:	Retail	and	wholesale	trade	 ‐0.162	 0.124	 ‐1.300	 0.193	 ‐0.406	 0.082	
Sector:	Other	services	 ‐0.128	 0.115	 ‐1.110	 0.267	 ‐0.354	 0.098	
Year	2009	 ‐0.461	 0.018	 ‐25.800 0.000	 ‐0.496	 ‐0.426	
(*)	dy/dx	is	for	discrete	change	of	dummy	variable	from	0	to	1	 		 		 		
Time	Spent	in	Regulations	means	"Percentage	of	senior´s	management	time	spent	in	dealing	
with	government	regulation"	 		
	
VI. Conclusions	
	
The	main	conclusion	of	this	paper	is	that	financial	development	has	a	negative	effect	on	
the	probability	of	a	firm	to	innovate	in	developing	countries.	This	conclusion	is	based	on	three	
reasons.	According	to	Tadesse	(2005,	2006),	financial	development	affects	innovations	in	terms	
of	 capital	 mobilization,	 which	 means	 more	 financially	 developed	 countries	 have	 greater	
amounts	 of	 capital	 flowing	 through	 their	 economies.	 However,	 the	 amount	 of	 capital	 in	 the	
economy	 is	 not	necessarily	well	distributed	between	all	 firms.	The	 conclusion	 is	 the	 financial	
system	 in	 these	countries	 is	 structured	 in	a	way	 that	only	 facilitates	 innovation	at	 the	 largest	
firms.	This	can	also	be	affirmed	based	on	Yan	et	al.	 (2014),	who	concluded	that	 in	developing	
countries,	 the	 amount	 of	 private	 credit	 due	 to	 insufficient	 capital	 increases	 risk	 and,	
consequently,	 discourages	 investments	 in	 innovations.	 In	 addition,	 according	 to	 Sylla	 et	 al.	
(2006),	 incumbents	 only	 support	 financial	 development	 if	 it	 represents	 an	 explicit	 gain	 for	
them.	Otherwise,	 they	 interfere	 in	 the	political	system	to	stop	any	project	 that	could	diminish	
their	privileged	positions.	Based	on	our	results,	only	large	firms	benefit	from	the	amount	of	time	
senior	 management	 spends	 dealing	 with	 government	 regulations,	 which	 may	 imply	 lobby‐
related	activites	 (Time	Spent	 in	Regulations	variable).	These	 firms	are	 the	ones	who	 increase	
their	probability	to	innovate.	Although	restricted	by	the	magnitude	of	the	estimators,	this	result	
is	a	confirmation	of	these	authors'	theses.	Finally,	although	we	found	different	signs	compared	
to	 those	 obtained	 by	 Sharma	 (2007),	 the	 firm	 size	 matters	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 effect	 of	
financial	 development	 on	 the	 probability	 to	 innovate.	 Because	 most	 companies	 in	 these	
countries	 are	 small	 or	medium	 size,	 the	 negative	 effect	 of	 the	 financial	 development	 is	more	
relevant	 than	 the	 positive	 effect	 it	 represents	 for	 large	 firms.	 It	 could	 also	 be	 concluded,	
according	 to	 King	 and	 Levine	 (1993),	 that	 the	 channel	 through	which	 financial	 development	
spurs	growth	in	developing	countries	is	not	innovation	because	the	capital	does	not	reach	the	
smallest	firms.	In	summary,	the	negative	effect	of	financial	development	on	the	probability	of	a	
firm	to	innovate	corresponds,	according	to	literature,	to	the	design	of	the	financial	system,	the	
lack	of	 capital,	 and	 the	 influence	 incumbents	may	have	on	 the	design	of	 the	 system,	with	 the	
results	benefiting	large	firms.		
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Appendix	1	
Graph 1 Percentage of observations per country 
 
Source: Table processed with data obtained from World Enterprise Surveys 
Graph 2 Sectors on the sample 
 
Source: Graphic processed with data obtained from the World Bank Database 
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Appendix	2	
 
Table 5 the effect of financial development on the probability to innovate: Probit Regressions, 
Robustness check 
Variables	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Financial	Development2	 ‐0.00327*** 0.00478***	 0.00292***	 0.00318***	 ‐0.00646**	(0.000689) (0.000761)	 (0.000958)	 (0.000979)	 (0.00281)	
Size	 0.131***	 0.223***	 0.224***	 0.224***	 0.581***	(0.0155)	 (0.0164)	 (0.0188)	 (0.0191)	 (0.118)	
GDPpc	 ‐0.000146*** ‐0.000153*** ‐0.000152***	 ‐0.000237***(4.02e‐06)	 (5.50e‐06)	 (5.57e‐06)	 (1.38e‐05)	
School	Enrollment	net	 0.00417**	 0.00360**	 0.0229***	(0.00167)	 (0.00169)	 (0.00411)	
Time	Spent	in	Regulations	 ‐0.00107	 0.00141	(0.000731)	 (0.00190)	
Financial	Development1*Size	 0.00442***	(0.00131)	
GDPpc*Size	 4.42e‐05***	(6.69e‐06)	
School	Enrollment	net*Size	 ‐0.0104***	(0.00211)	
Time	Spent	in	Regulations*Size	 ‐0.00128	(0.0009323)
Constant	 ‐0.222***	 0.376***	 ‐0.0783	 ‐0.0226	 ‐0.648***	(0.0515)	 (0.0560)	 (0.108)	 (0.111)	 (0.230)	
Sector	and	Year	Dummies	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Observations	 11,768	 11,768	 9,371	 9,101	 9,101	
Pseudo	R²	 0.061	 0.1503	 0.1609	 0.1604	 0.1657	
Prob>Chi²	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	 0.000	
Notes:	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
Significance	levels:	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
Time	Spent	in	Regulations	means	"Percentage	of	senior´s	management	time	spent	in	dealing	with	
government	regulation"	
 
   
Table 6 The effect of financial development on the probability to innovate: Instrumented Probit 
Regressions, Robustness check 
Variables	 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	
Financial	Development2	 0.00239	 ‐0.0345**	 ‐0.401***	 ‐0.374***	 ‐0.499***	(0.00430)	 (0.0175)	 (0.0942)	 (0.0838)	 (0.0686)	
Size	 0.128***	 0.214***	 0.0349	 0.0408	 1.557***	(0.0163)	 (0.0189)	 (0.128)	 (0.119)	 (0.431)	
GDPpc	 ‐5.50e‐05	 0.000271**	 0.000245***	 0.000155**	(4.27e‐05)	 (0.000106)	 (9.48e‐05)	 (7.17e‐05)	
School	Enrollment	net	 0.301***	 0.285***	 0.328***	(0.0694)	 (0.0628)	 (0.0448)	
Time	Spent	in	Regulations	 ‐0.0163***	 ‐0.0140**	(0.00546)	 (0.00636)	
Financial	Development1*Size	 0.272***	(0.0374)	
GDPpc*Size	 ‐0.000152***	(3.54e‐05)	
School	Enrollment	net*Size	 ‐0.0889***	(0.0132)	
Time	Spent	in	Regulations	*Size	 0.00363	(0.00308)	
Constant	 ‐0.338***	 0.683***	 ‐13.52***	 ‐12.60***	 ‐11.76***	(0.103)	 (0.144)	 (3.166)	 (2.832)	 (1.757)	
Sector	and	Year	Dummies	
Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
Observations	 11,768	 11,768	 9,371	 9,101	 9,101	
Wald	test	of	exogeneity	Chi²		 3.66	 6.77	 82.2	 87.53	 88.55	
Notes:	Standard	errors	in	parentheses	
Significance	levels:	***	p<0.01,	**	p<0.05,	*	p<0.1	
Time	Spent	in	Regulations	means	"Percentage	of	senior´s	management	time	spent	in	dealing	with	
government	regulation"	
 
	
